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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its ATTORNEY GENERAL, Phil L. Hansen,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, a municipal
corporation, by and through its BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, Mayor J. Bracken
Lee, and Commissioners George B. Catmull, Louis E. Holley, Conrad B. Harrison,
and James L. Barker; its CHIEF OF
POLICE, Dewey Fillis; and/or its LICENSE ASSESSOR, Thad Emery,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
11047

Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant
NATURE OF CASE

The State of Utah sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against Salt Lake City in
the District Court of Salt Lake County, seeking to be
declared unconstitutional and unauthorized by the
statutes of the State of Utah a municipal ordinance
enacted by Salt Lake City which purports to regulate and license all nonprofit clubs which allow the
consumption of beer and liquor by the members
on the premises.

2
In this brief, the State of Utah will be referred
to as the State; Salt Lake City will be referred to as
the City; the municipal ordinance will be referred
to as the Ordinance: and the nonprofit clubs will
be referred to as the locker clubs.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted a temporary restraining order, later superseded by a preliminary injunction . prohibiting the enforcement of the Ordinance pending the declaratory judgment.
The City moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that it did not state a cause of action on
which relief could be granted; and that the Attorney
General was not a proper party to seek the relief
for and on behalf of the State. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the City to
file its answer and to proceed. After considering
oral arguments and written memoranda, the lower
court filed its Memorandum Decision, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Declaratory Judgment.
The Dfstrict Court of Salt Lake County, Judge
Aldon J. Anderson, holding that the Ordinance was
neither in contravention of law nor an unconstitutional extension of power by the City, vacated the
preliminary injunction; and denied any further injunctive relief, except for extending for but two days
the effective date of the vacated preliminary injunction to permit the State to file with this Court a

3
motion for injuncive relief pending this appeal. The
motion by the State to have this Court enjoin the
City from attempting to enforce the Ordinance
pending this appeal was denied without notice or
hearing.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State seeks a reversal of the judgment of
the lower court by having this Court construe and
restrain the Ordinance and its enforcement as being
unconstitutional and unauthorized by the statutes
of the State of Utah insofar as the Ordinance purports to extend to the City powers which have not
been granted to the City; i.e .. inherent and plenary
police power which have been reserved to the
State itself alone, attempting to ensure to all of the
people throughout all of the State of Utah a constitutionally uniform operation of the very comprehensive State Liquor Control Act.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The City enacted the Ordinance, purporting to
regulate and license all nonprofit clubs. However,
a casual glance will disclose that the city enacted
the Ordinance, attempting to regulate and license
only some nonprofit clubs. The nonprofit clubs
which allow the consumption of beer and liquor by
the members on the premises, the so-called locker
clubs, constitute the sole collective target intended
to be hit by the application of this Ordinance.

4
Contending that it has reserved to itself alone
its inherent and plenary police power to regulate
liquor, by enacting and amending the State's very
comprehensive Liquor Control Act, the State of Utah
brought this action against Salt Lake City; by and
through the Attorney General, as the chief law enforcement officer of the State (See State of Utah, by
and through its Attorney General v. Alta Club, 120
Utah 121 at 134, 232 P.2d 759, 766 (1951)); to have
construed and restrnined the Ordinance and its enforcement; attempting, as required by law (Utah
Const. art I, § 24), to assure to all of the people
throughout all of the State of Utah a constitutionally
uniform operation of the State's very comprehensive Liquor Control Act; contending that there could
be no uniform operation of the State's very comprehensive Liquor Control Act if the courts of this State
were to condone local usurpation of state-reserved
police power, by potentially permitting each of the
29 counties and each of the 202 cities and towns
within the State of Utah to enact and enforce its
own peculiar ordinance that might not be in compliance with the State's very comprehensive
Liquor Cont r o 1 Act. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code
Ann. tit: 32; and as amended; Repl. Vol. Utah Code
Ann. §§ 16-6-13.1. 16-6-13.2, and 16-6-13.3 (1962); Repl.
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967); and
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §~ 11-10-2, 11-10-3, and
11-10-4 (1962).
A copy of the Ordinance to be construed by
this Court was included by reference in the complaint as Exhibit A. (R. 25-27.)
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As a convenience to this Court, a copy of the
Ordinance has also been included as an appendix
to this brief. Inserted therein are condensed observations by the State, supported by legal authority,
alleging some invalidities of certain sections of the
Ordinance.
The City relies on a combination of three
statutes for its power to enact and enforce the Ordinance:
1.
2.

Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962);
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962);
and
3. Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp.
1967).

These statutes will be discussed in detail as
each relates to the Ordinance and points of argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE HAS RESERVED TO ITSELF
ALONE ITS INHERENT AND PLENARY
POLICE POWER TO REGULATE LIQUOR.

The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the
United States, and the United States Constitution
is the supreme law of the Nation. (Utah Const. art.
I, § 3.)
The Utah Constitution, subordinate only to the
United States Constitution, is the supreme law of
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the State. (Enabling Act § 3; Pres'l Proc., Utah Code
Ann. Vol. I 0953); Duchesne County v. State Tax
Comm'n, 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335 (1943).)
The Utah Constitution is a framework erected
by the people of the State, in whom all political
power of the State is inherent (Utah Const. art. I, §
2), setting up a form of sovereign government
whereby and through which the people of the
State may act collectively in matters of common
concern throughout the State, wherein from their
nature action by individuals or local instrumentalities of the State (e.g., cities) would not be orderly
or effective, matters in which all of the peop]e
.throughout the State have a common interest, but
not necessarily a common point of view, remedy,
or solution. (Utah Const. Preamble; State v. Johnson. 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941).)
The Utah Constitution divides the powers of the
government of the State of Utah into three distinct
branches: legislative,· executive, and judicial. (Utah
Const. art. V, § I; Tite v. State Tax Comm'n, 89 Utah
404, 57 P.2d 734 (1936).)
The executive and judicial powers have no
paramount. applicability to issues of this case and
for that reason will not here be discussed without
specifity. All further refera.ls in this brief are intended to relate to the legislative power of government.
The Utah Constitution vests in the Legislature
and, under circumstances therein specified, in the
people of the State all legislative power of govern-

7

ment to enact. amend, and repeal any and all State
regulations and rules of law called statutes on any
subject within the sphere of government throughout the State as to which there is no constitutional
restraint or as to which there is no constitutional
mention. (Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers.
114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477, appeal denied, 336 U.S.
930, 69 Sup. Ct. 739, ~3 L. Ed. 1090 (1948); State ex
rel. Stein v. Christensen, 84 Utah 185, 35 P.2d 775
(1934); State ex rel. Nichols v. Cherry, 22 Utah 1, 50
Pac. 1103 (1900); Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah
368, 57 Pac. 1 (1899).)
The legislative power of the State is divided
into three fields: eminent domain, revenue, and
police. (State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P."2d 920, 117
A.L.R. 330 (1938).)
Eminent domain power, the legislative power
to condemn private property for public purposes, is
not applicable to this brief and for that reason will
not here be discussed.
Revenue power, the legislative power to raise
money by taxation without regulation for the operating costs of government, is not applicable to this
brief either and for that reason will not here be discussed, except as to later distinguish a revenue
power license and tax, which is money-raising in
nature, from a police power license and tax, which
is regulatory in nature.
Police power is inherent in the State and is the
legislative exercise of the sovereign right of government within constitutional limitations to prohibit,
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regulate, license, and tax in all regulatory fields of
government to promote the order, safety, health,
morals, and general welfare of the people throughout the State. (Utah Const. art. I, § 7; C.J.S., Const.
Law, § 175; State ex rel. Cox v. Board of Educ. of
Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 401, 60 Pac. 1013 (1900).)
Police power, being inherent in the State and
reserved to the Legislature and people, except
where expressly directed or permitted by the constitutions, may not be limited, surrendered, or otherwise delegated by the Legislature to the prejudice
of the general welfare of the people throughout the
State. (Utah Const. art. I, ~§ 2 and 7; Utah Const. art.
V, § l; Revene v. Trade Comm'n, 113 Utah 155, 195
P.2d 563 (1948); Western Leather & Finding Co. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 87 Utah 198, 48 P.2d 526 (1935);
Utah Mfr's Ass'n v. Stewart. 82 Utah 198, 23 P.2d
229 (1933); State v. Goss, 79 Utah 559, 11 P.2d (1932);
Retan v. Salt Lake City, 63 Utah 459, 226 Pac. 1095
(1924); Salt Lake City v. Bernhagen, 56 Utah 159,
189 Pac. 583 (1920); Young v. Salt Lake City. 24 Utah
321, 67 Pac. 1066 (1902).) Nevertheless, the Utah Constitution does expressly provide that the Legislature
shall provide by general law for the incorporation,
organization, and classification of cities that
may remain ·legislative or become chartered (Utah
Const. art. XI, § 5) without infringing on the constitutional form of state government. (Larsen v. Salt
Lake City, 44 Utah 437, 141 Pac. 198 (1914).)
Chartered cities will not here be discussed without specificity, because Salt Lake City is a legisla-
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tive city. (Rich v. Salt Lake City, No. 11117, D. Utah,
Feb. 20, 1968.) And for that reason all further references to cities in this brief are intended to relate
to legislative cities.
Cities are in their nature and purpose creatures,
instrumentalities, or local agents of the State to
exist, function, or be annihilated strictly at the will
of the Legislature for the convenient administration
of government throughout the State. Cities may exercise only those powers which have been expressly granted by the Legislature by general laws; those
powers which are reasonably implied as being
necessary to carry out those powers which have
been expressly granted; and those powers which
are essential to the declared objects and purposes
of all cities alike created, not merely convenient,
but absolutely indispensable. (16 C.J.S., Const. Law,
§ 140(b); 62 CJS., Mun. Corps., s§ 107 and l lO(b); 37
Am. Jur. 722; 1 McQuillin, (2d ed.) Mun. Corps.,
387; 1 Dillon, (5th ed.) Mun Corps., § 237, at 448;
Utah Const. art. XI, § 5; Hepl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §
10-8-84 (1962); Rich v. Salt Lake City, No. 11117, D.
Utah, Feb. 20, 1968; Salt Lake City v. Allred. 19 Utah
2d 254, 430 P.2d 371 (1967); although reversed on
rehearing, on point of preemption, Salt Lake City v.
Allred. No. 10752, D. Utah, Feb. 9, 1968, wherein
the cases of Kusse, Leo. Charlier. Hoffman. Howe.
and Doran. infra, were cited with approval; Salt
Lake City v. State Tax Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 359, 359
P.2d 397 (1961); Stevenson v. Salt Lake City, 7 Utah
2d 28, 317 P.2d 597 (1957); Ritholz v. Salt Lake City, 3
Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 (1955); Nasfell v. Ogden
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City. 122 Utah 344, 249 P.2d 507 (1952); Nance v.
Mayflower Tavern, 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 777 (1944);
Duchesne County v. State Tax Comm'n, 104 Utah 36.S,
140 P.2d 335 (1943); Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co.•
97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939); Salt Lake City v.
Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938); Riggins v.
District Court of Salt Lake County. 89 Utah 183, 51
P.2d 645 (1935); American Petroleum Co. v. Ogden
City. 90 Utah 465, 62 P.2d 557 (1936); Utah Rapid
Transit Co. v. Ogden City. 89 Utah 546, 58 P.2d 1
(1936), although reversed on other grounds by Rich
v. Salt Lake City. No. 11117, D. Utah, Feb. 20, 1968;
Lehi City v. Meiling. 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935);
Wadsworth v. Santaquin City. 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d
161 (1933); Salt Lake City v. Bennion Gas & Oil Co ••
80 Utah 530, 15 P.2d 648 (1932); Bohn v. Salt Lake
City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591, 81 A.LR. 215 (1932);
Morgan v. Salt Lake City. 78 Utah 403, 3 P.2d 510
(1931); American Fork City v. Robinson. 77 Utah 168,
292 Pac. 249 (1930); Salt Lake City v. Sutter. 61 Utah
533, 216 Pac. 234 (1923); Salt Lake City v. Bernhagen.
56 Utah 159, 189 Pac. 583 (1920); Ogden City v. Leo.
54 Utah 556, 182 Pac. 530 (1919); Salt Lake City v.
Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City. 52 Utah 540, 175
Pac. 654 (1918); Zamata v. Browning. 51 Utah 400,
170 Pac. 1057 (1918); Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake
City, 42 Utah 548, 134 Pac. 560 (1913); Tooele v. Hoffman. 42 Utah 596, 134 Pac. 558 (1913); American Fork
v. Charlier. 43 Utah 231, 134 Pac. 739 (1913); Salt
Lake City v. Doran. 42 Utah 401, 131 Pac. 636 (1913);
Pleasant Grove City v. Lindsay. 41 Utah 154, 125
Pac. 389 (1912); Salt Lake City v. Howe, 37 Utah 170,
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106 Pac. 705 (1910), Ann. Cas. 1912 C 189; Kimball
v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 Pac. 1, 45 LR.A.
628 (1899); Nelden v. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 59 Pac. 524,
77 Am. St. Rep. 917 (1899); Ogden City v. Boseman.
20 Utah 98, 57 Pac. 843 (1899); Ogden City v. Crossman, 17 Utah 66, 53 Pac. 985 (1898); Ogden City v.
Bear Lake & River, etc., Co., 16 Utah 440, 52 Pac. 697,
41 LR.A. 305 (1898).)
This view is well expressed in 1 Dillon (5th ed.),
Mun. Corps. 154:
It must now be conceded that the great weight of
authority denies in toto the existence, in the absence of special constitutional provisions, of any
inherent right of local self-government which is
beyond legislative control. The Supreme Court of
the United States has declared that a municipal
corporation in the exercise of all its duties, including those most strictly local or internal, is but a
department of the State. The legislature may give it
all the powers such a being is capable of receiving, making it a miniature State within its locality;
or it may strip it of every power, leaving it a corporation in name only; and it may create and recreate these changes as often as it chooses, or it
may itself exercise directly within the locality any
and all the powers usually committed to a municipality. So viewed its acts cannot be regarded as
sometimes those of an agency of the State and at
others those of a municipality; but, its character
and nature remaining at all times the same, it is
great or small according as the legislature shall
extend or contract the sphere of its action.

The City in this case now on appeal has never
yet contended the law in this State to be contrary
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to that which has been stated thus far in this brie~.
In fact, the City relies solely on the combination of
but three general laws for its specific statutory grant
of express power to enact and enforce the Ordinance:

1.

Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.

2.

Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
and

3.

Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
1967).

§

10-8-42 (1962);

§

10-8-81 (1962);

§

11-10-1 (Supp.

The City does not rely on its so-called general
welfare powers which are to be found in Repl. Vol.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (1962). Therefore, absolutely indispensable powers expressed in that statute
will not here be discussed. Nor will there be need
to distinguish the Allred or Kusse cases, supra,
which on the surface, but surely would not in final
analysis, seem to hold the general welfare powers of
the City to be carte blanche without need for any of
the other 84 express powers to be found in Repl. Vol.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-8-1-85 (1962) or any of the
other express powers to be found elsewhere
throughout the general laws of the State (e.g., Repl.
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967)) or within the constitutions. Suffice for now is to casually
emphasize until there be need for more vigorous
concern that the general grant of power to be found
in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (1962) is merely in aid of the special grants of express power elsewhere to be found in the legislative statutes called
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general laws which are required to have uniform
operation throughout the State (American Fork City
v. Robinson. 77 Utah 168, 292 Pac. 249 (1930)) and
does not enlarge or annul any special grant of express power. (Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8
P.2d 591, 81 A.LR. 215 (1932).)
Of initial decisive significance is the need to reflect, recall, and remember well pertinent definitions
while considering this matter on appeal.
A careful reading should disclose an awareness to the alert that the Ordinance attempts to regulate and license; that Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §
10-8-42 (1962) grants the express power to prohibit;
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962) grants
the express power to regulate; and Repl. Vol. Utah
Code Ann.§ 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967) compels the mandatory duty to license but not to prevent. Caution
should be exercised as these pertinent words are
defined and applied with pertinent rules ofi statutory
construction to the issues of this case.
Prevent means to obstruct, hinder, or thwart
beforehand, as an effective means to prohibit. United
States v. Williams. 28 Fed. Cas. 631, 633 (1852);
United States v. Souders. 27 Fed. Cas. 1267, 1269
(1871); In re Maclauchlan, 9 F.2d 534, 535 (2d Cir.
1925); In re Jones. 78 Ala. 419, 421 (1885); Random
House Dictionary of the English Language (unabr.
ed. 1966); Webster's New International Dictionary
(unabr. 3d ed. 1966).
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Prohibit means to forbid something from coming into existence. (Ogden City v. Leo. 54 Utah 556,
182 Pac. 530, 531, 5 A.LR. 960 (1919); Gordon v. City
of Indianapolis. 204 Ind. 79, 183 N.E. 124 (1932);
Simpkins v. State. 35 Okla. Crim. 143, 249 Pac. 168
(1926); City of Butte v. Paltrovich. 30 Mont. 18, 75
Pac. 521, 30 Am. St. Rep. 698 (1904); Random House
Dictionary of the English Language (unabr. ed. 1966);
Webster's New International Dictionary (unabr. 3d
ed. 1966).)
Regulate means to govern by rules of law
something that is already in existence. (Salt Lake
City v. Revene. 101 Utah 504, 124 P.2d 537, 539
(1942); Carter v. State Tax Comm'n. 98 Utah 96, 96
P.2d 727, 731, 126 A.LR. 1402 (1939); Ogden City v.
Leo. 54 Utah 556, 182 Pac. 530, 531, 5 A.LR. 960
(1919); Gordon v. City of Indianapolis. 204 Ind. 79,
183 N.E. 124 (1932); Simpkins v. State. 35 Okla. Crim.
143, 249 Pac. 168 (1926); Random House Dictionary
of the English Language (unabr. ed. 1966); Webster's New International Dictionary (unabr. 3d ed.
1966).)
License means to formally permit by lawful
authority the doing of something that would be unlawful if done without the license. (Roe v. Salt Lake
City. No. 10974, D. Utah, Jan. 23, 1968; Davis. v.
Ogden City. 117 Utah 315, 215 P. 2d 616, 622, 16
A.LR.2d 1208 (1950); Provo City v. Provo Meat &
Packing Co .. 49 Utah 528, 165 Pac. 477, 479, Ann.
Cas. 1918 D 530 (1917); Hom Moon Jung v. Soo, 64
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Ariz. 216, 167 P.2d 929, 930 (1946); Blatz Brewing Co.
v. Collins, 69 C~.l. App. 2d 639, 160 P.2d 37 (1945);
Random House Dictionary of the English Language
(unabr. ed. 1966); Webster's New International Die·
tionary (unabr. 3d ed. 1966).)
With the precaution of forever keeping in mind
these pertinent definitions, let us now proceed to
analyze the three statutes as they relate to the
Ordinance.
The first of the three statutes on which the City
relies for its power to enact and enforce the Ordinance is Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962),
which provides:
They [cities] may prohibit, except as provided by
law, any person from knowingly having in his possession any intoxicating liquor, and the manufacture, sale, keeping or storing for sale, offering or
exposing for sale, importing, carrying, transporting,
advertising, distributing, giving away, exchanging,
dispensing or serving of intoxicating liquors. (Emphasis added.)

Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962) was
enacted in this form in 1925 (Sess. Laws of Utah, ch.
11, § 1) and has never since been expressly amended. Nor until now has the City ever relied on this
sta_tute for any power at all to the City to regulate
and license locker clubs.
Applying pertinent definitions of prohibit, regulate, and license, gla.ringly disclosed is the realization that the express power to prohibit liquor, as

16
statutorily granted in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. ~
10-8-42 (1962), is no power at all to the City to regulate liquor, as attempted by the Ordinance. Nor
is the express power to prohibit liquor, as statutorily
granted in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962),
any power at all to the City to license liquor, as attempted by the Ordinance.
Furthermore, the express power to prohibit
liquor, as statutorily granted in Repl. Vol. Utah Code
Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962), is no power at all to the City to
regulate liquor and license liquor, as attempted by
the Ordinance, beca11se that which is prohibited is
unlawful. And that which is unlawful cannot be regulated and licensed. It may only ,be prohibited
prevented, and policed. (Davis v. Ogden City,
117 Utah 315, 215 P.2d 616, 622, 16 A.L.R.2d
1208 (1950); Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504,
124 P.2d 537, 539 (1942); Carter v. State Tax Comm'n,
98 Utah 96, 96 P.2d 727, 731, 126 A.LR. 1402 (1939);
Ogden City v. Leo, 54 Utah 556, 182 Pac. 530, 53 l,
5 A.LR. 960 (1919); Provo City v. Provo Meat & Packing Co., 49 Utah 528, 165 Pac. 477, 479, Ann. Cas.
1918 D 530 (1917); Simpkins v. State, 35 Okla. Crim.
143, 249-Pac. 168 (1926); City of Butte v. Paltrovich,
30 Mont. 18, 75 Pac. 521, 30 Am. St. Rep. 698 (1904).)
Still furthermore, the express power to prohibit
the sale and certain uses of liquor as statutorily
granted in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 10-8-42 (1962),
is no power at all to the City to regulate and license
for the consumption of liquor or beer, as attempted
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by the Ordinance, because neither consumption nor
beer are expressed in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §
10-8-42 (1962). And all grants of power to cities are
to be strictly construed to the exclusion of implied
powers that are not reasonably necessary to carry
out express powers and implied powers that are not
absolutely indispensable to carry out the purposes
of the City. (Nasfell v. Ogden City, 122 Utah 344, 249
P.2d 507 (1952): Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden
City, 89 Utah 546, 58 P.2d 1 (1936), although reversed
on other grounds by Rich v. Salt Lake City, No.
11117, D. Utah, Feb. 20, 1968; American Fork City v.
Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 Pac. 249 (1930); 62 C.J.S.
Mun. Corps. §§ 119, 135, and 139.) And the power of
the City should be denied if there is reasonable
doubt that the power has been granted. (Nance v.
Mayflower Tavern, 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944);
Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546,
58 P.2d 1, 3 (1936), although reversed on other
grounds by Rich v. Salt Lake City, Civil No. 1117,
D. Utah, Feb. 20, 1966; 1 Dillen, Mun. Corps. § 23'1
(5th ed. 1911); 62 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. §§ 119, 135, and
139.
One final observation relating to Repl. Vol. Utah
Code Ann. § 10-8-12 (1962), granting the power to
prohibit, certain named activities of liquor, except
as provided by law. Every single activity of liquor
as expressed in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42
(1962) is elsewhere statutorily lawful ... as provided
by law. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. tit. 32 (1966);
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-10-1, 11-10-2,
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11-10-3, and 11-10-4; 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, 166-13.3 (1962).) Therefore, Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-8-42 (1962), granting power to prohibit, except
as provided by law, is no power at all to the City to
even prohibit the activities of liquor expressed in its
own provisions.
Vve must now analyze Repl. Vol. Utah Code
Ann. § 10-8-8 l (1962) and Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
§ 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967), the last two of the three statutes on which the City relies for its power to enact
and enforce the Ordinance, as we decide whether
tho State has reserved to itself alone its inherent
and plenary police power to regulate liquor.
The spiE'cifics of these statutes will later be more
fully disclcsed and discussed. For now, however,
their general provisions are of more import to concerned attention.
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 10-8-81 (1962) provides the City may regulate all social clubs. Rep~.
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967) provides
the City shall license but not prevent all clubs which
allow the consumption of liquor by the members
on the premises. And the Ordinance purports to
regulate and license all nonprofit clubs but attempts
to regulate and license locker clubs only.
In determining whether the State has reserved
to itself alone its inherent and plenary police power to regulate liquor, notwithstanding Repl. Vol.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-8-42 and 10-8-81 (1962) and
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11-10-1 (Supp. 1967). legislative interpretation of
statutes, though not necessarily binding on this
Court, is entitled to weight. (Salt Lake City v. Towne
House Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 424 P.2d 442
(1967).) A glance at the history of legislative interprntation of statutes relating to the inherent and
plenary police power of the State and how it may
be and has been delegated to the City may prove
to be helpful in this instance as it has in others.
(Zamata v. Browning, 51 Utah 400, 170 Pac. 1057
(1918).)
When the Mormons arrived on the 24th day of
July 1847 to what is now called the State of Utah,
the area then belonged to Mexico. With very few
others ever being present from 1847 to 1850, the
Mormons were self-governed with Brigham Young
as their leader by_ the gospel of their religious faith.
(Bible, King James Version, so far as translated correctly; Book of Mormon: Pearl of Great Price; and
Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints.) Liquor was regulated
during these first years by the Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, Words of Wisdom, § 89.
In 1850, the United States purchased the area
and crealed it into a temporary government called
the Territory of Utah. (United States Congressional
Act, Sept. 9. 1850, Utah Code Ann. Vol. I, at 74 (1953).)
From 1850 until 1882, there seems to have been
neither special nor general territorial acts granting
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any express police power to regulate liquor. During these territorial days, cities were incorporated
under special charters that constitutionally met the
peculiar needs and desires of each city. Almost
every special charter granted its city the express
power to prohibit, regulate, license, and tax any
and all activities of liquor. (Zamata v. Browning. 51
Utah 400, 170 Pac. 1057 (1918).) Therefore, the Territory had not from 1850 until 1882 reserved to itself
alone its inherent and plenary police power to regulate liquor. Nor had the Territory granted its counties that power.
In 1882, the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah by a special territorial act amended the
special charter of Salt Lake City, grantng the city
the power to regulate, license, and tax the manufacture, sale, gift, or other disposition of spirituous,
vinous, malt, or other intoxicating liquors and the
power to restrain, prohibit, and punish same if done
without a license and the further power to prohibit
same on Sundays, public holidays, and election
vinous, malt, or other intoxicating liquors and the
days. (Laws of Utah 1882, ch. 3.) Also in 1882, the
Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah by a
general territorial act granted the counties similar
power. (Laws of Utah 1882, ch. 28.)
Except for general laws enacted in 1884 repealing all special charters and providing for the incorporation of cities and towns thereafter to be by general laws (Comp. Laws of Utah 1884, § 1775), these
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liquor laws enacted in 1882, with only slight
changes from time to time, continued in force
throughout the remaining territorial days until statehood in 1896 (Laws of Utah 1882, chs. 2 and 28; Laws
of Utah 1884, § 1775, subd. 41; Laws of Utah 1888, §
1775, subd. 41) and from statehood in 1896 until 1911
(Rev. Stat. of Utah 1898, § 206, subd. 41; Comp. Laws
of Utah 1907, § 206, subd. 41). These statutes were
the forerunners of Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. ~
10-8-42 (1962) and generally provided that the City
had the power to prohibit, regulate, license, and tax
liquor.
Therefore, neither the Territory from 1850 until
1896 nor the State from 1896 until 1911 had reserved
to itself alone its inherent and plenary power to regulate liquor.
In 1911, for the first time in Utah, the people
residing in cities, towns, and counties had a right
to vote on the issue of liquor within their respective
boundaries without longer entrusting this decision
to their respective local commissions or past legislatures.
The Local Option Act of 1911 provided for the
division of each county in the Sta:te into voting units
for the purpose of determining whether or not the
sale of liquor therein should be permitted. Each
city and each town constituted a separate unit, and
the remainder of the county constituted another
unit. (Sess. Laws of Utah 1911, ch. 106, § 48.)
If the people of a unit voted for the sale of
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liquor, the commission could not by ordinance prohibit the sale of liquor. The commission would in
that case have only the power to regulate and license the sale of liquor. If the people of a unit voted
against the sale of liquor, the commission could not
by ordinance regulate and license the sale of liquor.
The commission would in that case have only the
power to prohibit the sale of liquor. (Sess. Laws of
Utah 1911, ch. 106, § 61.)
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962) was
expressly amended in 1911, during the same session, to comply with the Local Option Act, by th8
Legislature deleting the word and and inserting the
word or. (Sess. Laws of Utah 1911, ch. 106 § 41) The
1911 amendment to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 108-42 (1962) then granted to the cities that had voted
again~t the sale of liquor only the power to prohibit
the sale of liquor and to the cities that had voted
for the sale of liquor only the power to regulate and
license the sale of liquor. As then amended, Repl.
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962), comprehensively regulating liquor, superseded all legislation
and city ordinances on the subject of liquor and
placed the burden on the cities to exercise their respective powers by enacting future ordinances in
compliance ·with powers granted by the 1911 general laws of the State. (Sess. Laws of Utah 1911, ch.
106, subd. 68: Pleasant Grove City v. Lindsay. 41
Utah 154, 160, 125 Pac. 389 (1912); Nephi City v.
Forrest. 41 Utah 433, 126 Pac. 332 (1912).) This illustrates the very well established and fundamental
rule of law that the Legislature has inherent and
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plenary police power to enact, amend, or repeal
any and all grants of power to cities. (See all authorities cited on pp. 9, 10, and 11 of this brief.)
Elections under the Local Option Act of 1911
resulted in the peopleo f most units voting against
the sale of liquor. Only a scattered few voted for
the sale of liquor. With this as its guide, the 1917
Legislature enacted the first, and thus far the only,
State Prohibition Act, taking effect August 1, 1917.
(Sess. Laws of Utah 1917, ch. 2, § 40.)
The State Prohibition Act of 1917 expressly prohibited liquor within the entire State of Utah and
thereby expressly repealed the Local Option Act of
1911 and all other acts and parts of acts in conflict
with its terms. (Sess. Laws of Utah 1917, ch. 2, § 39.)
The people of cities no longer had the right to vote
for or against the sale of liquor, and the City Commissions no longer had the power to regulate and
license the sale of liquor. The State of Utah in 1917
was statutorily bone dry. This further illustrates the
very well established and fundamental rule of law
that the Legislature has inherent and plenary police
power to enact, amend, or repeal any and all grants
of power to cities. (See all authorities cited on pp.
9, 10, and 11 of this brief.)
To be consistent the Legislature, while enacting
State Prohibition Act of 1917, expressly providing
that all acts or parts of acts inconsistent therewith to
be repealed, should have repealed expressly Repl.
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962) expressly
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amended in 1911 by withdrawing from the cities the
alternative power to regulate and license and by
retaining the sole power to prohibit liquor. The 1917
Legislature, however, did not do its housekeeping
as thoroughly as did the 1911 Legislature by amending expressly this statute to conform with the parent
statute. As amended by implication, however, Repl.
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962) after 1917
granted the cities only the restricted power to prohibit and withdrew from the cities the previously
granted power to regulate and license liquor. (Zamata v. Browning. 51 Utah 400, 170 Pac. 1057 (1918);
State v. Frederic, 28 Ida. 709, 155 Pac. 977 (1916).)
In 1917, Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42
(1962). being construed as the express power granted to the City to only prohibit liquor, was not to be
construed as a mandate by the State to the cities
to enforce only the State Prohibition Act of 1917.
With this construction, and with the aid of the general welfare clause of cities (Repl. Vol. Utah Code
Ann. § 10-8-84 (1962)), the cities could then prosecute
as misdemeanors prohibition violations relating to
liquor in their own courts under their own ordinances, retaining their own collections of fines, so
long as those ordinances conformed to this statute
and were not in conflict with the other general laws
of the State. For example, under this construction,
the City could not pass an ordinance making the
sale of liquor a misdemeanor if the sale of liquor under state law was an indictable misdemeanor. (Zamata v. Browning. 51 Utah 400, 170 Pac. 1057 (1918);
State v. Frederic. 28 Ida. 709, 155 Pac. 977 (1916).)
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It would appear that the State Prohibition Act
of 1917 represented the trend of the march throughout the entire ccmntry to effect total prohibition of
liquor, because the Federal Prohibition Act was
passed by Congress December 3, 1917, only four
months and two days following the State Prohibition
Act of 1917. The Federal Prohibition Act, being ratified January 29, 1919, and taking effect December
29, 1920 (U.S. Const. amend. XVIII), repealed all federal. state, county, city, town, and all other laws
throughout the 1?ntire United States of America pertaining to liquor. Liquor was absolutely prohibited
throughout all of the United States. \A/ithout doubt,
at this point of time, December 29, 1920, Repl. Vol.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962) was in fact repealed,
notwithstanding the fact that its express language
remained unaltered, because Congress and the several states had concurrent power to enforce the
Federal Prohibition Act by appropriate legislation
(U.S. Const. amend. XVIII, § 2) to be subsequently
enacted.

In 1925, the State complied with this constitutional directory by expressly amending and enacting Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962). The
1925 amendment and enactment deleted from the
1911 statute the words or regulate and license and
inserted the words except as provided by law. so
that the 1925 amendment as then enacted expressly
granted cities the power only to prohibit liquor, except as provided by law. As was earlier discussed
in depth, it is abundantly clear that Repl. Vol. Utah
Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962), granting only the power
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to prohibit liquor, grants the City no power at all
that would deny that the State has reserved to itself
alone its inherent and Plenary police power to
requla te liquor.

It is of decisive significance at this phase of legislative history to again reflect, realize, and remember well that it was that verv same Legislature of
1925, by enacting Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-842 (1962) in its present express terms, withdrew from
the City ail power to regulate and license liquor
and at the very same session, by ena_cting Repl. Vol.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962), which provides:
They [cities] may regulate all social clubs, recreationa! associations, athletic associations and kindred associations, whether incorporated or not,
which maintain club rooms or regular meeting
roo:·ns or regular meeting rooms within the corpo;:ate limits of the city. (Emphasis added.)

Applying the rules of strict, limited, and narrow
construction, as so persistently and as so authoritatively required by this Court (all authorities cited on
pp. 9. 10, and il of this brief), Repl. Vol. Utah Code
Ann. ~ 10-8-81 (1952), grantir;g the City the power to
regulate all social clubs, grant no power at all
to the City to regulate liquor, because no implied
power to "regulate liquor is reasonably necessary
to carry out the eYpress power granted to regulate
.-::11 social clubs a.nd because no implied power to
regulate liquor is absolutely indispensable to carry
out the objects ond purposes of the City. At least
for these reasons in 1925, Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
~§ 10-8-42 nor 10-8-81 (1962) granted the City any
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power at all that would deny that the State had reserved to itself alone its inherent and plenary police
power to regulate liquor. (See all authorities cited on
pp. 9, 10, and 11 of this brief.)
At least for these reasons, the 1925 Legislature
did not intend to grant any power at all to the City
to regulate liquor. Therefore, the State in 1925 had
rese:ved to itself alone its inherent and plenary
police power to regulate liqUor. (See all authorities
cited on pp. 9, 10, and 11 of this brief.)
Another reason why the 1925 Legislature did
not intend to grant any power at all to the City to
regulate liquor was because liquor was prohibited
in 1925 from being anywhere present within the
State and Nation. That which is prohibited is unlawful, and that which is unlavdul cannot be regulated.
It may only be prohibited, prevented, and
policed. (Davis v. Ogden City, 117 Utah 315, 21.S
P.2d 616, 622, 16 A.L.R.2d 1208 (1950); Salt Lake City
v. Reven3, 101 Utah 504 . 124 P.2d 537, 539 (1942);
Carter v. State Tax Comm'n, 98 Utah 96, 96 P.2d 727,
731, 126 A.LR. 1402 (1939); Ogden City v. Leo, 54
Utah 556, 182 Pac. 530, 531, .s A.LR. 960 (1919); Provo
City v. Provo Meat & Packing Co., 49 Utah 528, 165
Pc:c. 477, 479, Ann. Cas. 1918 D 530 (1917); Simpkins
v. State, 35 Okla. Crim. 143, 249 Pac. 168 (1926);
City of Butte v. Paltrovich, 30 Mont. 18, 75 Pac. 521,
30 Am. St. Rep. 698 (1904).) Therefore, the 1925 Legislature did not intend to grant the City any unconstitutional or statutorily unlawful power at all to regulate liquor.
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Still another reason why the 1925 Legislature
did not intend to grant any power at all to the City
to regulate 1iquor was because the locker clubs
which are the sole collective target of the Ordinance
had not as yet in 1925 even been contemplated, conceived, or created. These statutorily peculiar locker
clubs did not exist until created by the 1955 Legislature. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§§ 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1,
16-6-13.2, and 16-6-13.3 (1962).)
State a.nd federal prohibition continued until
December 5, 1933, when the Federal Prohibition Act
was repealed, returning to the several states their
inherent and plenary police power to prohibit, regulate, and license liquor. (U.S. Const. amend. XXU
Therefore, by supreme constitutional mandate in
1933, the State had reserved to itself alone its inherent and plen'.:uy police power to regulate liquor,
notwithstanding the express power granted to the
City to regulute all social clubs as provided in 1925
by Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962).
Following the repeal of the Federal Prohibition
Act, at the very next session of the Legislature, the
St::tte Prohibition Act of 1917 was likewise repealed,
by the Legislature enacting the Liquor Control Act
of 1935, taking effect March 25, 1935, expressly reserving to the State itself alone its inherent and
plenJry police p0wer to prohibit, regulate, and license all alcoholic beverages, including light beer,
heavy beer, wine, and liquor (Sess. Laws of Utah
1935 ch. 43), notwithstanding the express power
granted to the City to regulate all social clubs as
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provided in 1925 by Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
l '1-8-81 (1962).
One reason why the 1935 Legislature intended
to reserve to the State itself alone its inherent and
plenary police power to prohibit, regulate, license,
and tax liquor is first evidenced by the title to the
Liquor Control Act, which provides for a system of
state control of all alcoholk beverages. (Sess. Laws
of Utah 1935, ch. 43.)
Another reason why the 1935 Legislature intended to reserve to the State itself alone its inherent
and plenary police power to regulate, license, and
tax all alcoholic bbeverages is further evidenced by
some. but by no means all, of the very numerous
details relating to the police power to regulate, license, and tax that are to be found in the various
sections of the original Liquor Control Act. For example, the State has reserved to itself alone its inherent and plenary police power to regulate and
license, as attempted by the Ordinance, all liquor
and beer wherever consumed (§ 6(e)), licensed (3
6(1)), and regulated (§ 7), as attempted by the Ordinance, sold, possessed, used (§ 6(f)), kept (§ 6(i)),
stored(§ 9(p)), dispensed (§a76), bonded (§ 76), had
(§ 115), disposed (§ 180), given (§ 180), etc., etc., etc.
The detail with which liquor and beer have
been covered is not to be found in other statutes
dealing with other matters. Courts construing statutes of this nature have generally held that the
State has reserved to itself alone the inherent and
plenary police power to regulate liquor and beer.
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(Riggins v. District of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183,
51 P.2d 645 (1935): Mc>"yor v. Randall, 67 Ariz. 369,
196 P.2d 477 (1948); People v. DeYoung, 39 Cal. Rptr.
598 (Super. Ct. 1964), aff' d, 39 Cal. Rptr. 487 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1964); City of Miami v. Kichinko, 22 So.2d
627 (Fla. 1945); Anderson v. Nick, 402 Ill.
508, 84 N.E.2d 394 (1949); City of Pineville v. Tarver,
231 La. 446, 91 So.2d 597 (1956); State v. Haswell, 414
P.2d 652 (Mont. 1966); City of Lyndhurst v. Compola,
169 N.E.2d 558 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960); Munoz v. City
of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. 1958).)

Still another reason why the 1935 Legislature
never intended either Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §
10-8-42 (1962) or Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81
(1962) as any power at all for the City to enact and
enforce the Ordinance is further evidenced by other
of the the many provisions of the original Liquor
Control Act of 1935. For further example: Sheriffs
of the several counties have the duty to enforce the
provisions of the Liquor Control Act within incorporated cities and towns with the same diligence
as within territory in their respective counties outside of cities and towns (§ 205); and all other officials
within the entire State have the duty to enforce the
provisions of the Liquor Control Act; i.e., all city,
county, precinct and state executive, prosecuting
and peace officers are expressly charged with the
enforcement of the provisions of the Liquor Controi
Act (§ 206).
And still another reason why the 1935 Legislature never intended either Repl. Vol. Utah Code

31
Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962) or Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-8-81 (1962) as any power at all for the City to
enforce and enact the Ordinance is the same reason
why no Legisla_ture between 1925 and l 935 ever
intended any such power, and that is because the
locker clubs which are the sole collective target of
the Ordinance had not as yet during those years
even been contempla.ted, conceived, or created. As
drnady stated, but to restate, these peculiar
locker clubs did not exist until created by
the 1955 Legislature. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§
16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, and 16-6-13.3 (1962).)
Next to be determined is whether any Legislature since 1935 has ever intended either Repl. Vol.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962); Repl. Vol. Utah
Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962) as any power at all for
the City to enact and enforce the Ordinance.
In 1937, the Legislature granted cities the express power to prohibit, regulate, license, and tax
the retail sale of light beer. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code
Ann. § 32-4-17 (1966).) No such grant of power presently exists for liquor. Therefore, neither Repl. Vol.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962) nor Repl. Vol. Utah
Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962) is any grant of power at
all for the City to enact and enforce the Ordinance.
because a well established rule of construction is
that, in the absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary, the enumeration of some
powers within a subject (e.g., those relating to the
retail sale of light beer, an alcoholic beverage) implies the exclusion of all other powers within that
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subject (e.g., those relatinCJ to liquor, also an alcoholic beverage). (62 C.T.S. Mun. Corps. § 120; City
of Tulsa, Okla. v. Midland Valley R.R., C.C.A. Okla.,
168 F.2d 252; Arnold v. City of Chicago, 387 Ill. 532,
56 N.E.2d 795; City of Bloomington v. Wirrick, 381
Ill. 347, 45 N.E.2d 852, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 756, 63
Sup. Ct. 1175, 87 L. Ed. 1709; Van Eaton v Town of
Sidney, 211 Iowa 986, 231 N.W. 475, 71 A.LR. 820,
43 C.J. 197, n. 19.)
From 1935 until 1951, the maintenance by nonprofit clubs of private lockers in which members
stored liquor which had been lawfully purchased
c.nd which had been brought there individually by
the members to their lockers and which clubs permitted the members to consume liquor on the premises while engaged in usual club activities was not
in violation of the liquor Control Act declaring to
be nuisances places where people gathered to consume liquor (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 32-8-46 and
32-8-47 (1966)); nor in violation of the Liquor Control
Act declaring to be unlawful the consumption of
liquor in a public building, park, or stadium (Repl.
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-13 (1966)). (State v. Alta
Club. 120 Utah 121, 232 P.2d 759 (1951).)
From 1935 until 195S, the maintenance of such
a system as the iocker clubs was known to the State
Liquor Control Commission, and frequent inspections of the clubs were made by law enforcement
officers of that commission. State Liquor Control
Commission having its own law enforcement officers is an added reason why the Legislature intend-
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ed that the State reserved to itself alone all of its
inherent anci plenary police power to regulate
liquor. An opinion was rendered by the Office of
the Attorney General in 1945 holding the locker
clubs system was in vicilat]on of the law. Also in
19 115, the Senate of the Legislature conducted an invo:::tlgation of the workinqs of the then liquor control
~ystem during which investigations of the locker
system then in vogue was brought to its attention. ln
1947, in response to an inquiry of a state senator, the
Attorney General again stated his belief that such
system was not in violation of the law. In another
letter addressed to a legislator in 1949, the Attorney
Gsneral, wferring to certain inconsistencies in the
Li.::ruor Control Act, stated that there was a serious
doubt a.s io the legality of the locker system and
ridded:
"We cannot refrain from respectfully expressing
the hope that the Le::;islature will clarify the situation in this regard."

Despite this knowledge and advice, the Legislature
did not from 1935 to 1951 enact any statute specifically making the locker club system illegal. (State v.
Alta Club, 120 Utah l/,l, 232 P.2d 759 (1951). Following the Alta Club case, supra, in 1951 until 1955, the
locker clubs were still left without governmental
regulation because their conduct with liquor was
not made illegal.
The 1955 Legislature, however, amended Repl.
Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 16-6-13; enacted §§ 16-6-13.l,
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16-6-13.2, and lG-6-13.3; a.nd retained~~ !Go~( G.nJ
16--6-15 (1962); statutorily providing that the locker
clubs shall be legal in this State only when operated
in compliance with the 1955 Locker Club Law, thereby intendinq to reserve to itself alone all of its in~
horent and plenary police power to regulate and
license for the general welfare of the people
throughout the State. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §
16-6-13.1 (1962).)

Every socir"J.l club, recreational or athletic association or kindred association (identical terms as
some with:n certain provisions of the Ordinance),
i.e., every locker club which was already then incorporated or which wr:..s to be incorporated under
corporated or which were to be incorporated under
the provisions of the 1955 Locker Club Law and
which allowed the storage and consumption oi
liquor by the members and the serving of liquor by
club personnel on the premises, were to be legal
after 1955 only if they complied to the 1955 Locker
Club Law. (Repl. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-13.1 (1962).)
The locker clubs are required to procure,
file, and maintain a good and sufficient bond in the
amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000), approved
by the Secretp_ry of State (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-6-13.1 (1962).) The locker clubs are required
to file with the Secretary of State a copy of
their constitution; bylaws, and house rules, all of
wh~ch contain, among other things, the fourteen
n:rovisions as enumerated in the 1955 Locker Club
Law. (Repl. Vol. UL:1h Code Ann§ 16-6-13.1 (1962).)

35
All then existing social clubs, recreational or
·::C ihletic associations or kindred associations (identical terms as some with certain provisions of the
Ord)n::rnce) which were already incorporated were
rT:mte:::l thirty days to comply with the terms of the
l %S Locker Club Law. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
~ l 6-6-13.2 (1962).) All statutes or parts inconsistent
with the 1955 Locker Club Law were thereby repealed. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 16-6-13.3 (1962).)
All peace officers throughout the State were statutorily granted the right to enter the club rooms or
meeting rooms of social clubs, recreational or athletic associations or kindred associations (identical
terms as some within certain provisions of the Ordinance) which complied with the 1955 Locker Club
L:iw for the purpose of determining whether any
laws were being violated therein. (Repl. Vol. Utah
Code Ann. § 16-6-14 (1962).) Any persons knowingly
incorporating under the provisions of the 1955
Locker Club Law with the object of pecuniary profit
and all persons having possession of any charter
revoked by the Secretary of State under the 1955
Locker Club Law and refusing upon demand to deliver up such charter so revoked are guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine in any
sum not exceeding Two Hundred Dollars ($200) or
by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding
thirty days or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-15 (1962).)
Locker clubs being social establishments and
subject to regulation (Entre Nous Club v. Tronto, 4
Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (1955), the 1955 Locker Club
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Lak must have uniform because it is the adoption of
very comphhensive measures, providing that the
State has reserved to itself alone its inherent and
plenary police power to regulate and license liquor
in locker clubs. The 1955 Locker Club Law granting
no express power to the City to enact and enforce
the Ordinance, therefore, implies the City is without
any power at all to enact and enforce the Ordinance.
(Kent Club v. Tronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 P.2d 870
(1957) Any without any power to regulate and license locker clubs.
The 1955 Locker Club Law, an amendment to
the 1935 State Liquor Control Act, became another
vehicle through which the Legislature intended to
reserve to itself alone Hs inherent and plenary police
power to regulate and license liquor in locker clubs.
Certain duties were reposed in the Secretary 0f
State both in issuing charters to locker clubs
when the requlrements of the law are met
and inforfeiting them when there is a failure
to comply there w it h. (Entre Nous Club v.
Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98. 287 V2d 670 (1955); Citizen's
Club v. Welling. 83 Utah 81, 27 P.2d 23 (1933), cited
and approved in Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d
67, 305 P.2Q. 870 (1957).) The locker clubs owe their
existence to the State. (Young Constr. Co. v. Dunne,
123 Kan. 176, 254 Pac. 323 (1927); Four-S Razor Co. v.
Guymon, 110 Kan. 745, 205 Pac. 635, cited in Kent
Club v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 P.2d 870 (1957).)
The powers and privileges of the locker clubs are
conferred on conditions imposed by the Legislature
when the locker cluhs accept their charters and
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consent to the conditions imposed by the Legislature. The 1955 Locker Club Law itself then becomes
a part of the corporate contract called a charter to
be issued by the State itself to such locker clubs
without any express statutory mention of cities,
thereby implying the exclusion of any power being
granted to the City to enact and enforce the Ordinance (Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 P.2d
870 (1957).)
It should be remembered that the keeping of
liquor and permitting its use is of such a nature
that it is directly related to the public morals and
welfare so that the regulation of the manufacture,
transportation, sale, and use (e.g., consumption) of
alcohol and other intoxicating liquors is an exercise
of the inherent and plenary police power of the
State unless and until the State clearly intends to
grant any of its police power to cities or other qualified agents. (Utah Mfr's Ass'n v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198,
23 P.2d 229 (1933), cited and approved in Kent Club
v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 P.2d 870 (1957).)
The enactment of subsequent legislation (1955
Locker Club Law) containing a specific grant of
power (to the Secretary of State to regulate and license liquor in locker clubs) which power is kindred
to that contained in prior legislation (Repl. Vol. Utah
Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962), the second of the three
statutes on which the City relies for its power to enact and enforce the Ordinance), the prior legislation
containing a general grant of power (to regulate all
social clubs, enacted in 1925 when liquor was pro-
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hibited in the State and Nation) usually suggests
conclusion that the subsequent specific gran
power (to the Secretary of State to regulate
license liquor in locker clubs) in the subseq1
legislation (1955 Locker Club Law) was not inclu
within the prior qeneral grant of power (City to
ulate all social clubs) in the prior legislation (F
Vol. Utah Code Ann. ~ 10-8-81 (1962).) (Salt Lake
v. Towne House Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417,
P.2d 442 (1967), wherein this Court held that the
may regulate and license nonprofit social club~
der the authority as presently granted by Repl.
Utah Code Ann. ~ 10-8-81 (1962); that the 1955 Lo
Club Law established a procedure for the SecrE
of State to regulate locker clubs; and althougl:
issue wa.s neither presented nor decided, that,
haps, the State had reserved to the State itself a
its inherent and plenary police power to reg1
and license liquor in locker clubs.)
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962)
acted in 1925, though never since expressly am
ed, was amended by implication by the Legislc
enacting the 1935 State Liquor Control Act (]
Vol. Utah Code Ann. tit. 32 (1966)) and again b~
acting the 1955 Locker Club Law (Repl. Vol.
Code Ann.§§ 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, and 16-E
(1962).) The earlier and latter statutes cannot by
reasonable interpretation be reconciled so as t
enforceable as a harmonious whole, becausE
latter statutes reserve to the State itself its inhE
and plenary police power to regulate liquor (
v. Rives, 40 Utah 47, 119 Pac. 1034 (1911), cited
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approved in Salt Lake City v. Towne House Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 424 P.2d 442 (1967)); and
for the further reason that they conflict by the earlier
statute granting the City the power to provide by
the Ordinance for the revocation of license of privileges granted by the State by charter to be regulated by the State itself alone through the Secretarv
of State and not by the City Commission, all of which
would constitute an unconstitutional infringement
on the right of contract if permitted to stand in violation of the due process clauses of both constitutions.
(U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV; Utah Const. art. I,
§ 7.) (Salt Lake City v. Allred, No. 10752, D. Utah,
Feb. 9, 1968; Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93
P.2d 671 (1938); 62 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § 143(b).)
For these and other reasons desired or required,
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962) grants the
City no power to regulate liquor, that which the
State has reserved to itself alone as an exercise of its
inherent and plenary police power.
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-8-42 and 10-8-8i
(1962), the first and second statute on which the City
relies, having failed to grant the City any power a.t
all to enact and enforce the Ordinance, we must
now analyze Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1
(Supp. 1967), the last of the three statutes on which
the City relies to determine whether this statute
grants the City any power at all to enact and enforce
the Ordinance.
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967),
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when first enacted in l gsg, provided:

Cities and towns within the corporate limits, an
counties outside of corporate cities and towns shal
license all establishments, associations and corpora
tions, except nonprofit corporations bonded and
regulated und::T provisions of sections 16-6-13.1
16-6-13.2 and 16-6-13.3, Utah Code Annotated 195~
as enacted by Chapter 25, sections 2, 3, and 4, Law
of Utah 1955, that operate a club, business or asso
ciation which allows the customers, members 01
guests to possess or consume liquor on the premises
provided the license does not permit the licensee
operator or employee of either to hold, store, o
possess liquor on the premises. However, nothing i1
this section shall be construed to prevent person:
other than the licensee, operator or employees o
either, from possessing and consuming, but not stor
ing, liquor on premises, except as otherwise pro
vided for by statute. (Emphasis added.)

Although legislative interpretation of sta
is not necessarily binding on this Court, it is en
to weight. (Salt Lake City v. Towne House Atl
Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 424 P.2d 422 (1967).) Then
this Court should give weight to the legislativ
terpretation of statutes expressed by the 1959 l
lature.
The Legislature, enacting the so-called
Set-up Law, the forerunner of Repl. Vol. Utah (
Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967), the last of the threE
utes on which the City relies for its power to
and enforce the Ordinance. in very precise
pointed terms, as it excepted the locker clubs 1
from, statutorily expressed the legislative intE
tation of all three statutes (Repl. Vol. Utah Code
1
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~~ 10-8-42, 10-8-81, and 11-10-1 (1962) and that in 1959

no one or any combination of the three granted any
power at all to the City to enact and enforce the
Ordinance, because the State had reserved to itself
its inherent and plenary police power to regulate
c nd license liquor in locker clubs.
Although executive interpretation of statutes is
not necessarily binding on this Court, it is entitled
to weight. (State v. Alta Club, 120 Utah 121, 232
P.2d 759 (1951), 82 C.J.S., Statutes, 901.) Therefore, this
Court should give weight to the executive interpretation until 1967 of the three statutes on which the
City relies for is power to enact and enforce the Ordinance (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-8-42, 10-8-81,
and 11-10-1 (1962), but the City never before enacting the Ordinance until 1967 ever attempted to regulate and license the locker clubs for the consumption of beer and liquor by the members on the
premises. The City must admit this executive interpretation, but it is contending in this matter now
on appeal before this Court that the 1967 Legislature granted the City for the first time the power to
regulate and license liquor in locker clubs by its
amending and enacting Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
§ 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967) by deleting from the 1959 Setup Law the express words which had before
excepted the locker clubs that were regulated and
licensed by the 1955 Locker Club Law, which expressed the legislative interpretation that the State
had reserved to itself alone its inherent and plenary
police power to regulate and license liquor in locker
clubs.
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We must now analyze Repl. Vol. Utah Code
Ann.§ 11-10-l (Supp. 1967), the last of the three statutes on which the City relies for its power to enact
and enforce the Ordinance, which provides:
Cities and towns within the corporate limits, and
counties outside of corporate cities and towns shall
license all establishments, associations and corporations, that operate a club, business or association
which allows the customers, members or guests to
possess or consume liquor on the premises, provided the license does not permit the licensee, operator or employee of either to hold, store, or
possess liquor on the premises. However, nothing
in this section shall be construed to prevent persons
other than the licensee, operator or employees of
either, from possessing and consuming, but not
storing, liquor on the premises, except as otherwise provided for by statute. (Emphasis added.)

Assuming, but not admitting, that the 1967 Legislature intended Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. ~
11-10-1 (Supp. 1967) to apply to the locker clubs, we
must apply pertinent definitions to determine what
powers at all this statute grants to the City o enact
and enforce the Ordinance.
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967)
expressly provides that cities shall license for the
consumption of liquor. No power is granted to prohibit. Therefore, this statute is of no comfort to the
City as an aid to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42
(1962), which grants the power to prohibit. Nor is
any power granted to regulate. Therefore, this statute is of no comfort to the City as an aid to Repl.
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § l 0-8-81 (1962) which express-
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1y grants the power to regulate. Of course, both
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-8-42 and 10-8-81
(1962), the first two of the three statutes on which
the City relies for its power to enact and enforce the
Ordinance, having been earlier repealed as here
before discussed, neither could later be revived by
this or any other statute. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
~ 63-3-5 (1959): Lagoon Jockey Club v. Davis County,
72 Utah 405; 270 Pac. 543 (1928).)
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 11-10-1(Supp.1967),
by the use of the mandatory words shall license and
shall not prevent, compels the City to license all
places for the consumption of liquor that fall within
its terms and meet the four licensing qualifications
that are required by Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. ~
11-10-2 (1962). No power is granted to prohibit the
consumption of liquor, because the power to prohibit includes the power to prevent (Ogden City v.
Leo, 54 Utah 556, 182 Pac. 530, 531, 5 A.L.R. 960
(1919)), and there is not here any power to prevent.
No power is granted to regulate the Consumption
of liquor, because the power to regulate includes
the power to prohibit and prevent to some degree
the activity that is continued to be regulated. (Ogden City v. Leo, 54 Utah .556, 182 Pac 530, 531, 5
A.LR. 960 (1919; Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah
504, 124 P.2d 537, 539 (1942); State ex reL Hollywood
Jockey Club v. Stein, 133 Fla. 530, 180 So. 863; City
of Tacoma v. Keisel, 68 Wash. 685, 124 Pac. 137, 139
(1912); Blumenthal v. City of Cheyenne, 64 Wyo. 75,
186 P.2d 556 (1947).)
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With clarity and brevity a challenge is here
made to any and all to discover and disclose any
statutory grant of power by the Legislature to the
City to regulate liquor in the State of Utah. There
being no such grant of power, it must be admitted
as apparent that the State has reserved to itself alone
its inherent and plenary police power to regulate
liquor, thereby depriving the City of any power to
enact and enforce the Ordinance which attempts
to regulate liquor.
POINT II
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST VAGUENESS.

Section 20-29-1 of the Ordinance attempts to
define a nonprofit club:
A non-profit club as used in this section shall be defined to be any social club, recreational or athletic
association whether incorporated or not which
maintains club rooms, regular meeting rooms or
facilities within the city limits.

This section is unconstitutionally vague. Its uncertainty affords no standard guidelines for its enforcement. There is no meaningful definition of the
word nonprofit; e.g., absence of purpose for pecuniary gain is not even mentioned.
The Statute relied on by the City for its granted
power to pass this Ordinance (Repl. Vol. Utah Code
Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962).) does not include the phrase
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or facilities that is included in this definition in the
Ordinance. The Statute includes club rooms or regular meeting rooms only. The Statute does not include ... or facilities. If neither club rooms nor regular meetings rooms were maintained, the use of
the word or, in the disjunctive sense, reduces the
definition within this section to a nonprofit club that
maintains facilities. Without facilities being defined,
the provision is vague; and would permit discrimnation toward those who would maintain club
rooms or regular meeting rooms, as against those
clubs that do not maintain club rooms or regular
meeting rooms, but do maintain facilities other than
club rooms or regular meeting rooms. And, even
with facilities being defined, the inclusion of facilities, in addition to club rooms or regular meeting
rooms, would amount to an unlawful attempt by
the City to exercise powers not expressly granted,
causing this Section to be invalid. (See all authorities
on pp. 9, 10 and 11 of this brief.)

This section is also otherwise fatal to the Ordinance, because every other section is dependent
on thiss ection for its competent application in attempting to determine just what nonprofit club is
to be regulated and licensed.
Nonprofit clubs are defined by the expressed
general laws of the State of Utah.
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
1967) provides:

§

16-6-19(3) (Supp.
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The words ''nonprofit corporation" means a corporation no part of the income of which is distributable to its members, trustees or officers, or a nonprofit co-operative association.

Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
provides:

§

16-6-21 (Supp. 1967)

Corporations whose object is not pecuniary profit
may be organized under this act for any lawful
purpose ... social ... athletic ... recreational ...

Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
vides:

§

16-6-13 (1962) pro-

... any social dub, rcreational or athletic association, or kindred association, incorporating under the
provisions of this chapter, that such club or association ... the object of which is not for pecuniary
profit... .

Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-13.1 (1962), in
addition to the definition in § 16-6-13, includes those
clubs that are bonded and regulated by the State
(not City) to operate as what are commonly referred
to as the locker clubs.
The City has no power to enact nor enfotce
this Ordinance, as an attempt to regulate and license
locker clubs, · because the Ordinance is repugnant to the general laws of the State (Utah Const.
art. XI, § 5; Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962);
Jones v. Logan City, 19 Utah 2d 169, 428 P.2d 160
(1967); State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d
12 (1961).)
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POINT III
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST DISCRIMINATION.

Sections 20-29-2, 20-29-3, 20-29-4, 20-29-5, 20-29-6,
20-29-7, 20-29-8, 0-29-9, 20-29-10, 20-29-11, 20-20-19,
and 20-29-24 of the Ordinance in question are unconstitutionally discriminatory.
Section 20-29-2 of the Ordinance in question
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any non-profit club to operate within Salt Lake City without first obtaining
a license.

Section 20-29-2 is unconstitutionally discriminatory as it pertains to any nonprofit club. The City
has not purported to license all nonprofit clubs; yet
this Ordinance does not purport to license nonprofit
clubs which permit consumption of liquor only.
Yet, still, Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp.
1967), as relied on by the City, provides expressly
that cities shall license . . . consumption of liquor
only. No more! Consumption of beer is not included.
in the statute. Neither does the Ordinance purport
to regulate and license the unincorporated. nonprofit
clubs which do not maintain club rooms, regular
meetings rooms, or facilities; instead, the Ordinance
purports onlv to regulate and license incorporated
clubs called locker clubs.
This section is unconstitutionally discriminatory
and also void as being repugnant to the general
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laws of the State. (See authorities cited under Point
II of this Brief, p. 46; Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann~
(1962); Repl. §§ 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, 16-6-3.3
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 1-10-1 (Supp. 1967); Repl.
Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-10-2, 11-10-3, 11-10-4 (1962);
and Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. tit. 32 (1966); wherein the State has preempted the field of liquor attempted to be entered by the City.)
Sections 20-29-3, 20-29-4, 20-29-5, 20-29-6, 20-29-7,
20-29-8, 20-29-9. 20-29-11, and 20-29-19 of the Ordinance in question are unconstitutionally discriminatory by their attempt to classify the operations and
determine different fees for each of three classes;
while each class relates to the common class of consumption only; and while the common class of consumption only relates to the vaguely defined class
of all nonprofit clubs. The Ordinance is unconstitutionally discriminatory in the further sense that by
its own definition, nonprofit clubs are purported to
be licensed and regulated whether incorporated or
not; yet applicants for Class "C" licenses are required to be incorporated by the State; as being
nonprofit, bonded ($5,000 cash). chartered, and regulated by the State (not regulated by the City); under the provisions of Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§
16-6-13, 16-6-13..1, 16-6-13.2, and 16-6-13.3 (1962);
and Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-6-19(3) and
16-6-21 (Supp. 1967). Those not so qualifying, i.e.,
all places except locker clubs, are permitted by the
City under the provisions of Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lake City, Utah, (1965) tit. 9, ch. 4, without meet-
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ing any of the qualifications enumerated in Section
19 of the Ordinance, to have consumption of liquor
on the premises by the payment of a $50 per year
license fees.
The Ordinance in these respects is unconstitutionally discriminatory, repugnant to, and not uniform with the general laws of the State, as found
within but not limited to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 10-8-42, 10-8-81, and 10-8-84 (1962); Repl. Vol. Utah
Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 967); Repl. Vol. Utah
Code Ann.§§ 11-10-2, 11-10-3, and 11-10-4 (1962); Laws
of Utah 1963, ch. 17, § 2(1); Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, et al. within ch. 6
(1962); Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. tit. 32 (1966); Utah
Const. art. XI, §5; art. I,§ 7; art. I, § 12; art I, § 24; art.
I, 27; U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV; and Rev. Ord.
S.L.C. Utah tit. 19, chs. 1 -25 (1965).
None of the alleged authority offered by the
City in this case grants the City the power to discriminate, and within the discriminated classes, no
less. Nor does any of the alleged authority offered
by the City in this case grant the City the power to
regulate and license the locker clubs by this Ordinance. The Ordinance charges one class $1; provided, neither the consumption of beer nor the consumption of liquor is permitted on the premises. It
charges another class $200; provided, the consumption of beer only is permitted on the premises. Nowhere has the State granted the City any power to
license for the consumption alone of beer alone. It
charges another class $250; provided, both the consumption of beer and the consumption of liquor are
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permitted on the premises. It charges $1 if beer is
sold; provided, neither the consumption of beer nor
the consumption of liquor is permitted on the premises. And it charges absolutely nothing; provided,
the consumption of liquor only is permitted on the
premises. The Ordinance is unconstitutionally discriminatory against the Locker Clubs et al. (Roe v.
Salt Lake City, Civil No. 10974, D. Utah, Jan. 23, 1968)
and amounts to an unconstitutional infringement on
the rights of contract of the State, by its charter to
the locker clubs, and by the attempt through this
Ordinance by the City to revoke State chartered
activities. The City may not prohibit that which the
State permits. (Pleasant Grove City v. Lindsay, 41
Utah 154, 160, 125 Pac. 389 (1912); Zamata v. Browning, 51 Utah 400, 170 Pac. 1057 (198).) Nor may the
City regulate and license that which the State has
preempted to itself. (Riggins v. District of Salt Lake
County, 89 Utah 83, 51 P.2d 645 (1935).) Cities have
only those powers granted by the State. (Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161
(1933); and many, many other Utah cases, as cited
in Point L pp. 9, 10, and 11 of this brief.
Section 20-29-10 of the Ordinance is unconstitutionally discriminatory, as being violently
repugnant to the general laws of the States as enumerated throughout Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§
16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, 16-6-13.3 (1962); Repl. Vol.
Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967); and Repl.
Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-10-2, 11-10-3, and 11-10-4
(1962). These Statutes clearly provide all the necessary requirements for receiving a charter from the
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State to operate the locker clubs, which are regulated by the State; and for receiving a license from
the City for the consumption alone of liquor alone.
The Ordinance can require no more from the locker
clubs, if any at "111, than it requires from the other
places that permit the consumption alone of liquor
alone.
Section 20-29-1 g of the Ordinance in question is
unconstitutionally discriminatory and repugnant to
the general laws of the State of Utah, by requiring
more qualifications than are required by Repl. Vol.
Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-2 (1962) for the consumption
alone of liquor alone, as the State has by mandate
compelled that the City shall license every place
that permits the consumption of liquor on the premises.
POINT IV
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST INFRINGEMENT ON CONTRACT.

Sections 20-29-3, 20-29-4, 20-29-5, 20-29-6, 20-29-9,
c:tnd 20-29-23 of the Ordinance in question amount
to a collective unconstitutional infringement on the
rights of contract of the State, by its charter to the
locker clubs, and by the attempt through this Ordinance by the City to revoke State chartered activities. (U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 and Utah Const. art. I, §
18.)
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The City may not prchibit that which the State
permits. (Pleasant Grove City v. Lindsay, 41Utah154,
160, 125 Pac. 389 0912); Zamata v. Browning. 51 Utah
400, 170 Pac. 1057 (19l8).) Nor may the City regulate
and license that which the State has preempted to
itself. (Riggins v. District of Salt Lake County. 89
Utah 83, 5 P.2d 645 (1935). Cities have only those
powers grnnted by the State. (Wadsworth v. Santaquin City. 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (1933); and many,
many other Utah cases, as cited in Point I, pp. 9, 10,
and 11 of this brief.
By the issuance of a State charter, contractual
rights and duties are created. Only the parties to
that contract may revise its terms and conditions,
and even they must afford due process to all. The
City may not frustrate the policy or the rights of the
State or the locker clubs. Any attempt by the City
to refuse to license or suspend or revoke the chartered privilege granted by the State would be unconstitutional and void in every respect. (U.S. Const.
art I, § 10; Utah Const., art I,~ 18; and Repl. Vol. Utah
Code Ann.§§ 16~6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, and 16-6-13.3 (1962).)
POINT V
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
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Sections 20-29-7 and 20-29-9 unconstitutionally
violate the right against self-incrimination (U.S.
Const. amend. V and Utah Const. art. I, § 2), by requiring the production of financial statements. (Marchetti v. United States, 388 U.S. 904, No. 2, Jan. 29,
1968.)
POINT VI
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL R I G H T AGAINST ILLEGAL
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.

Sections 20-29-7 and 20-29-9 unconstitutionally
violate the right against illegal searches and seizures (U.S. Const. amend. IV and Utah Const. art. I,
§ 14), by requiring a key for entry for unlimited use
without consent or warrant. (Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L. ed. 2d 930
(1967).
And Section 20-29-20 unconstitutionally violates
the right against illegal searches and seizures (U.S.
Const. amend. IV and Utah Const. art I, § 14), by
requiring without consent or warrant the right of
entry to any peace officer for the purpose of his determining whether any laws or ordinances are being violated and . . . to make periodic inspections
of the premises, reporting his findings to the Board
of Commissioners. (Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, L. ed. 2d 930 (1967).)
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POINT VII

THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CONST
TUTIONAL RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS 0
LAW.

Section 20-29-22 unconstitutionally violate
right against due process of law (U.S. Const. am
V and XIV), by its use of the conjunction am
making the locker clubs and others named, c
of a misdemeanor, even though only one, no
or more, might have in fact intended only to
mit, or did in fact intend to and did commit th
or even though two or more did not consp:
commit the act that one only did in fact comm
act.
This Section 20-29-22 unconstitutionally vii
the due process of law (U.S. Const. amends. \
XIV and Utah Const. art. I, §~ 7, 10, and 12), by
ing the locker clubs the presumption of innoc
right to trial by jury, right to be confronted l
witnesses against them, etc., etc., etc., ... ar
denying the State and/or the locker clubs thE
form operation of all laws of a general nature.
Const. art. I, § 24; Christensen v. Harris, 109 U
163 P.2d 314 (1945): Untermeyer v. State Tax
m'n, 102 Utah 214, 129 P.2d 881 (1942).)

1

CONCLUSION
The decision of the lower court should l
versed with a declaratory judgment by this
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against the City (Defendant-Respondent); denying
the City any power to enact or enforce the Ordinance, and permanently restraining the enforcement of the Ordinance.
Dated this 6th day of March, 1968.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
ROBERT J. STANSFIELD
Assistant Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
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APPENDIX
AN ORDINANCE
AN ORDINANCE ADDING Section 29 to Title
20 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah
1965, relating to the regulation of non-profit clubs
and associations.
Be it ordained by the Board of Commissioners
of Salt Lake City, Utah:
SECTION 1. That a new section be added to
Title 20 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City,
Utah, 1965, to be known as Section 20-23-1 through
20-29-25, relating to the licensing and regulation of
non-profit clubs and associations, be, and the same
hereby is, to read as follows:
Section 20-29-1.

Definitions.

A non-profit club as used in this section shall
be defined to be any social club, recreational or
athletic association or kindred association whether
incorporated or not which mains club rooms, regular meeting rooms or facilities within the city
limits.
Observation by State

This Section is unconstihlt1onally vague. Its un-
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certainty affords no standard guidelines for its enforcement. There is no meaningful definition of the
word nonprofit; e.g. absence of purpose for pecuniary gain is not even mentioned.
"Beer" means any beverage containing
not less than one-half of one per centum of alcohol
by weight and obtained by the alcoholic fermentr:i.tion of an infusion or decoction of any malted grain,
or similar products, and which contains not more
than three and two-tenths per centum of alcohol by
weight and may or may not contain hops or other
vegetable products and includes ale, stout or porter.
Beer.

Liquor. "Liquor" means and includes alcohol,
or any alcoholic, spirituous, vinous, fermented, malt
or other liquid or combination of liquids, a part of
which is spirituous, vinous, or fermented, and all
other drinks or drinkable liquids, containing more
than one-half of one per centum of alcohol by
weight; and all mixtures, compounds or preparations, whether liquid or not, which contain more
than one-half of one per centum of alcohol by
weight, and which are capable of human consumption; except t0.at the ter m"liquor" shall not include
"beer" as herein defined.

Section 20-29-2. It shall be unlawful for any
nonprofit club to operate within Salt Lake City without first obtaining a license.

Observation by State
.s Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory
~rtains to any nonprofit club. The Ordinance
:s to regulate and license all nonprofit clubs;
ttempts to regulate and to license only some
fit clubs.
------

--

--------

ction 20-29-3. Non-profit club licenses issued
the provisions of this chapter shall be classio the following types of operations and shall
he privileges and responsibilities hereinafter
ed in this chapter:
Class ''A''
Class "B''
Class "C"
Observation by State

iis Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory
attempt to classify the operations and deter:lifferent fees for each of three classes; while
:lass relates to the common class of consumpnly.

~ction 20-29-4.

A Class "A" license shall apall non-profit clubs which do not allow the
mption of beer or intoxicating liquors on or at
emises.

A-4
Observation by State

This Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory
for the same reasons as those stated in Observation
by State under Section 3.
Section 20-29-5. All applications for a Class
"A" license shall at the time of application file with
the licenses assessor and each time the license is
renewed a statement indicating the elected officers
and directors of the club.
Observation by State

This Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory
for the same reasons n.s these stated in Observation
by State under Section 3.
Section 20-29-6. A Class "B'' license shall apply to all non-profit clubs which allow the consumption of beer in containers but not intoxicating liquor
at or on premises.
Observation by State

This Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory
for the same reasons as those stated in Observation
by State und9r Section 3.
-------------·-------

Section 20-29-7.

All applications for a Class "B"
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license shall at the time of application file with the
license assessor and each time the license is rene\llred a verified statement incorporating the requirements of Section 5 of this chapter and in addi'tion thereto list the managing directors or personnel and their salaries, location of all facilities operated by the club and a financial statement for
the prior year of operation, and that the officers,
directors, managing personnel and employees have
complied with the requirements and possess the
qualifications specified in the Liquor Control Act
of the State of Utah and if entrance to the premises
or facilities of the club is only by use of a key or
other device then a key or such device must be
supplied to the chief of police, and that the sale of
beer will be made to members and guests only.
The statement shall be executed by the president,
chief officer or managing director of said club.
Observation by State
This Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory
for the same reasons as those stated in Observation
by State under Section 3. It is also unconstitutional
as a violation of the right against self-incrimination.
by requiring the production of financial statements;
and the right against illegal searches and seizures,
by requiring a key for entry for unlimited use without consent or warrant.
Section 20-29-8. A Class "C" license shall apply to all non-profit clubs which allow the consump-
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tion of beer in containers and intoxicating liquor
or at their facilities or premises.
Observation by State

This Section is unconstitl1tionally discriminate
for the same reasons as those stated in Observati1
by State under Section 3.

Section 20-29-9. All applications for a Class"(
license shall at the time of application file with u
license assessor and each time the license is :
newed a verified statement incorporating the:
quirements of Secs. 5 and 7 of this chapter and
addition thereto shall submit a copy of its constr
tion, bylaws and house rules, and each club sh:
abide by and conform to said constitution, byla1
and house rules. The constitution, bylaws a:
house rules shall provide among other things:
"(l) That all classifications of members m
be admitted only on written application and or
after investigation and approval by the governr
body. Such admissions must be duly recorded
the official minutes of a regular meeting of the g.
erning body.

"(2) Standard of eliqibility for members.
"(3) Limitation on the number of members c
sistent with the nature and purpose of the club
association.

A-7
"(4) Reasonable initiation fees and dues consistent with the nature and purpose of the club or
association.
"(5) The period for which dues shall be paid
and the date upon which such period shall expire.
"(6) Reasonable regulations for the dropping
of members for the non-payment of dues or for
other causes.
"(7) Strict regulations for the government of
association or club rooms and quarters generally
consistent with the nature and character of the association or club.
"(8) That rooms and quarters must be under
the supervision of a manager or house committee,
who shall be appointed by the governing body of
the association or club.
"(9) Provisions for visitors and for the issuance
and use of guest cards, which shall be issued for a
period of not to exceed two weeks. A record of the
issuance of each such card shall be maintained and
available for the inspection by the license assessor
at all times.
"(10) That the sale of food and beverages by
any such club or association must be conducted by
the club or association itself and in its own right
and not upon any concession basis either to any
member of the club or association or to .any third
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party.
"(11) That no member, officer, agent or employee of any such club or association shall be paid
or directly or indirectly receive, in the form of salary or otherwise, any revenue from the operation
of the club or association beyond the amount of
such reasonable compensation as may be fixed or
voted by the proper authorities and in accordance
with the constitution and bylaws of the club or association.
"(12) That said club or association shall not
engage in any public solicitation or public advertising ofo pen house activities, banquets, cocktail
hours or similar functions.
"(13) That all property of said club or association shall belong to all the members thereof in common.
"(14) That each club or association shalt in its
own name, own or lease premises suitable for its
activities. If leased premises are occupied by said
club or association the lease must be for at least a
twelve month period. A copy of the lease shall be
filed with the license assessor."
Observation by State

This Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory
for the same reasons as those stated in Observation
by State under Section 3. It is also unconstitutionally
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discriminatory, as being repugnant to the general
laws of the State, by requiring qualifications for a
license that were not required by the granting power relied on for the lkense, and by not requiring
any of the four qualifications that were required by
the granting authority relied on. (Age, citizenship,
character, and record in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
~ 11-10-2 (1962). Further, the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void for the added reason that it amounts
to an infringement on the right of contract. By the
issuance of a State charter, contractual rights and
duties are created. Only the parties to that contract
may revise its terms and conditions, and even they
must afford due process to all. The City may not
frustrate the policy or rights of the State or the
Locker Clubs. Any attempt by the City to refuse to
license, or to suspend or revoke the chartered privilege grunted by the State would be unconstitutional and void in every respect. (U.S. Const. art. I,
2 l 0; and Utah Const. art. I, § 18.)
--------

----~-

----

Section 20-29-10. Each non-profit club to qualify under this ch.=:i.pter must supply to the license assessor or his agents immediate access to its books
for the purposes of ascertaining whether the club
is in fact a non-profit organization or whether it is
operating for and realizing a pecuniary profit.
Observation by State

as

This section is unconstitutionally discriminatory
being violently repugnant to the general
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laws of the State as enumerated throughout Repl.
Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2,
16-6-13.3 (1962); Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1
(Supp. 1957); and Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§
11-10-2, 11-10-3, and 11-10-4 (1962). These statutes
clearly provide all the necessary requirements for
receiving a charter from the State to operate the
Locker Clubs, which are regulated by the State; and
for receiving a license from the City for the consumption alone of liquor alone. The Ordinance can
require no more from the locker clubs, if any at all,
than it requires from the other places that permit
the consumption alone of liquor alone.
Section 20-29-11. If at any time it is determined
tha.t the club is in fact operating for pecuniary profit
the license issued under this chapter hall be suspended and the club required to procure the various business and regulatory licenses enumerated
in the ordinances of Salt Lake City which apply co
the operation of the club.
Observation by State

This Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory
for the same reasons a.s those stated in Observation
by State under Section 3.
--------------

Section 20-29-12. It shall be unlawful for any
non-profit club to operate without complying strictly with the health ordinances and regulations of
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Salt Lake City as set forth in the title relating to
he::i.lth regulations.
Section 20-29-13. It shall be unlawful for any
non-profit club to operate without complying strictly with the fire code of Salt Lake City, as set forth
in the ordinances relating to !ire prevention.
Section 20-29-14. It shall be unlawful for a club
holding a Class "C" license to operate a locker system for the storage and serving of intoxicating
liquor unless organized as a non-profit corporation
pursuant to Chapter 6, Title 16 of the Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended. All peace officers are
given the express right to confiscate without the
prior issuance of a writ or warrant of such confiscation, any liquor in any types of containers which
are stored on the premises of a club that is not
properly labeled as to ownership or stored in a
member's locker and to which no one claims title.
Section 20-29-15. The license shall be issued
upon the filing of an application to the City License
Assessor. All applications filed in accordance with
t;1e provisions of this chapter shall be referred to
~he chief of police for inspection and report. The
chief of police shall within ten days after receiving
s.~ch 0pplication forward a report to the Board of
Commissioners as to the general reputation and
character of the persons who habitually frequent
such place, whether such club is conducted in a
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lawful, quiet and orderly manner, the nature and
kind of entertainment if any at such place, whether
gambling is or has been permitted on the premises
or by any member, officer or director at their place
and the proximity of the premises to any church or
school.
Section 20-29-16. All applications filed in accordance with this chapter shall be referred to the
health department who shall inspect all premises
owned and operated by the club to assure sanitary
compliance with the laws of the State of Utah, the
ordinances of Salt Lake City and the rules and requlations of 1he health department.
Section 20-29-17. It shall be unlawful for any
club to maintain any premises or facilities without
complying with the following lighting and view requirements:
(1) During business hours a mm1mum of 5
candle power light measured at a level of five feet
above the floor shall be maintained.

(2) No enclosed booths, blinds or stalls shall
be erected or maintained.
(3) A clear, unobstructed view of all portions
of the interior shall be available at all times from a
point within the licensed premises at or near the entrance to ea_ch room.
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Section 20-29-18. It shall be unlawful for the
club acting through its employees or managing director holding a Class "B'' or Class "C" license and
any employee, member, guest club officer or director to:
(a) Have in his possession beer or intoxicating
liquor contrary to state statutes.
(b) Sell beer or intoxicating liquor in violation
of state statute.
(c) Supply beer or intoxicating liquor to any
person under the age of twenty-one years.
(d) Permit drunkeness to take place in or on
any of the club premises or facilities.
(e) Permit any person under the age of twentyone years to remain in or about the lounge or bar
area of the premises or facilities of the club.
son.

(f)

Supply beer or liquor to an intoxicated per-

(g) Serve or mix beer or liquor on or at the
premises or facilities or knowingly permit any persons to consume beer or liquor on the premises and
facilities between the hours of one a.m. and seven
a.m. of any day, except when New Years Day falls
on Monday, then until three a.m.
(h) Permit the use of the premises for any unlawful purpose.
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Section 20-29-19. Each club that maintains on
its premises such facilities for the playing of cards
or other games of chance shall so indicate in its application to the license assesor the number of tables
and type of paraphernalia to be so used and the location on the premises.
-----

----~--

Observation by State

This Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory
and repugnant to the general laws of the State of
Utah, by requiring more qualifications than are required by RepL Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-2 (1962)
for the consumption alone of liquor alone, as the
State has by mandate compelled that the City shall
license every place tha1. permits the consumption
of liquor on the premises.
Section 20-29-20. Any peace officer shall have
the right to enter the club room, meeting rooms,
premises and facilities of non-profit clubs for the
purpose of determining whether any laws or ordinances are being violated therein and in the case
of clubs holding Class "B" or Class "C" licenses,
the police department shall make periodic inspections of said premises and reports its findings to the
Board of C0mmissioners.
Observation by State

This Section is unconstitutional, as a violation of
the right against illeqal searches and seizures, pro-
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tected by the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
Section 20-29-21. Any existing non-profit club
shall have thirty days after the effective date of this
ordinance to comply with the terms hereof. Providing, however, that any club having operated
under a prior license from the city in providing any
services or facilities which are prohibited under this
chapter may continue to so provide said services
end facilities so long as they remain at the premises
Jcscr]bed in the prior licenses.
Section 20-29-22. The provisions of this chapter may be enforced by injunctive relief and in addition thereto, the club and any member, guest, employee, agent, manager, director and officer is found
to violate any provision of this ordinance is guilty
ot c: misdemeanor.
Observation by State

This Section is unconstitutional, as against due
process, by its use of the conjunction and, by making the Locker Clubs and others named, guilty of
a misdemeanor, even though only one, not two or
more, might have, in fact, committed the act. (U.S.
Const. amends. V and XIV.)
Section 20-29-23. Licenses may be suspended
or revoked by the Board of Commissioners for the
'violation of any provision of this title or any other
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applicable ordinance or law relating to alcoholic
beverages. The Commission shall prior to revocation conduct a public hearing upon not less than
ten days notice to the club by serving notice of the
hearing upon any officer or director thereof.
Observation by State

This Section is an unconstitutional infringement
on right of contract, by attempting to suspend or revoke the privilege proposed by the license. It is repugnant to the general laws of the State of Utah.
(Rpel. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-613.2, 16-6-13.3 (1962); Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §
11-10-1 (Supp. 1967): and Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 11-10-2 and 11-10-3 (1962).)
Section 20-29-24. License fees. Applications
provided for in this chapter shall be accompanied
by the fees hereinafter provided which fee shall be
deposited in the City Treasury if the license is
granted and returned to the applicant if denied:
For Class "A" license $1.00 per annum or any
part thereof.
For Cla·ss "B" license $200.00 per annum or any
part thereof.
For Class "C" license $250.00 per annum or
any part thereof.
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Observation by State

This Section is lmconstitutionally discriminatory
for the same reasons ets those stated in Observation
by State under Section 3.
Section 20-29-25. All ordinances or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed. If
any section or provisions of this chapter shall be
declared invalid or unenforceable by any court of
competent jurisdiction the remainder of the act shall
not be affected thereby.
SECTION 2. In the opinion of the Board of
Commissioners it is necessary to the peace, health
and s:i.fety of the inhabitants of Salt Lake City, Utah,
that this ordinance become effective immediately.
SECTION 3. This ordinance shall take effect
upon its first publication.
Passed by the Board of Commissioners this
......... day 0£.. .............................................. , 1967.
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